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n 26 September 2013, the European Parliament invited Sir Iain Lobban, Director of 
the UK’s intelligence-gathering agency GCHQ, to testify before the LIBE Committee 
inquiry on the electronic surveillance of EU citizens.1 MEPs wanted answers in the 
face of mounting evidence (obtained from leaks by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden) 
of the UK’s involvement in wide-ranging and illegal surveillance practices linked to the NSA-
led PRISM programme, including the routine mass interception of communications data and 
cyber-hacking of foreign companies and diplomats. In declining the Parliament’s invitation, 
the UK government was unequivocal: “National security is the sole responsibility of Member 
States.  The  activities  of  intelligence  services  are  equally  the  sole  responsibility  of  each 
Member State and fall outside the competence of the Union.” 
This view, echoed by the EU’s former Lithuanian Presidency as justification for limiting EU-
US  discussions  that followed  the Snowden  disclosures,2  is  largely  shared  by  the member 
states.  A  majority  of  national  governments  across  the  EU  have  long  tried  to  ring-fence 
matters of national security from supranational scrutiny by the EU institutions and courts by 
arguing that these remain within the remit of their ‘exclusive competence’. Yet in light of the 
revelations indicating that more EU member states (namely Sweden, France and Germany) 
are  running  their  own  secret  interception  programmes  (albeit  on  a  smaller  scale),3  the 
question of whether the EU can and should intervene becomes more pressing. Are the covert, 
large-scale surveillance programmes of member states beyond the scope of EU intervention? 
This commentary puts forward four important legal reasons why the answer to this question 
should be no.  
                                                             
1 The European Parliament’s Inquiry on the Electronic Mass Surveillance of EU Citizens was launched in July 
2013, following the revelations of Edward Snowden and ran until December 2013.  
2 Letter of Dalia Grybauskaitė, President of Lithuania to Martin Schulz, President of the European Parliament of 
30 July 2013 (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/organes/libe/libe_20130912_1000.htm).  
3 These allegations and their implications for EU law are explored in more detail in the CEPS study by D. Bigo et 
al. (2013), “Mass Surveillance of Personal Data by EU Member States and its Compatibility with EU Law”, CEPS 
Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe No. 61, CEPS, Brussels, November. 
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First, the EU is competent to regulate and protect the fundamental rights of data protection 
and  privacy,  and  any  derogation  member  states  wish  to  apply  to  those  rights  must  be 
overseen by European institutions and courts. The EU’s competence over data protection is 
regulated  by  a  raft  of  data  protection  directives,  which  are  currently  being  updated  and 
extended  under  the  so-called  ‘data  protection  reform  package’.  Furthermore,  the  EU  is 
charged  with  protecting  the  privacy  rights  of  Union  citizens  and  the  privacy  of  everyone 
falling within the scope of EU law, as enshrined in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
Any interference with privacy rights and data protection obligations – and the large-scale 
surveillance of an individual’s communications data cannot constitute anything but – must 
be justified under EU law.   
National security is one of the grounds available to state authorities to justify interference 
with the exercise of an EU protected right. However, any limitation of a fundamental right, 
including on grounds of national security, must be interpreted restrictively, according to the 
Court  of  Justice  of  the  EU  (CJEU).4  It  is  ultimately  for  the  CJEU  to  ensure  that  this 
interference  does  not  go  beyond  what  is  permitted  by  law,  that  it  is  proportionate  to  a 
legitimate aim and limited to what is necessary in a democratic society to achieve that aim. 
Thus, while it is in the first instance the prerogative of member states to assess their own 
national security needs, when that assessment results in the interference with an EU right, 
then the compatibility of the national security measure is a matter to be determined by the 
EU institutions. 
Second, secret surveillance is not only subject to EU oversight, but it also falls under strict 
judicial control by the European Court of Human Rights. It is highly uncertain that the large-
scale surveillance as alleged to be practiced by the UK and others would be deemed lawful 
within the judicial system governed by the European Convention on Human Rights. In its 
jurisprudence the Strasbourg court has established detailed criteria with which to determine 
the  legality  of  a  state’s  secret  interception  of  communications.  According  to  the  Court, 
surveillance  should  be  targeted,  and  domestic  law  regulating  surveillance  must  be 
“foreseeable”: in other words, formulated with sufficient precision so as to guarantee legal 
certainty. This is a critical condition to prevent the arbitrary and unfettered use of powers by 
security  agencies.  The  court’s  firm  position  on  surveillance  was  recently  supported  at 
international  level  by  the  UN  resolution  of  18  December  2013,  which  recognises  an 
international  right  to  privacy  and  calls  on  governments  to  respect  and  protect  this 
international  right.5  We  doubt  that  the  mass,  routine  and  indiscriminate  surveillance  as 
practiced in the UK and elsewhere would meet the Court’s minimum standards, nor would 
they respect these international principles.  
Third, to what extent can we distinguish these practices from acts of cybercrime? The Council 
of Europe’s 2001 Convention on Cybercrime identifies illegal access and illegal interception 
as  an  offence  against  the  confidentiality,  integrity  and  availability  of  computer  data  and 
systems under criminal law. The EU has taken the Council of Europe Convention as a legal 
reference point, and building on this foundation is developing a substantial body of policy to 
boost  cybersecurity  and  enhance  its  operational  capacities  with  the  establishment  of  the 
                                                             
4 See C-300/11 Z.Z. CJEU 4 June 2013 and C-293/12 Digital Rights Ireland v Ireland, Opinion of AG Cruz Villalon; 
see also S. Peers (1996), “National Security and European Law”, Yearbook of European Law, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 
363-404. 
5 UN General Assembly draft Resolution on the right to privacy in the digital age, 68th session, Third Committee, 
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European Cybercrime Centre within the EU’s law enforcement agency Europol. Responding 
to the links made between cybercrime and unlawful state surveillance, Europol Director Rob 
Wainwright claimed that while the EU’s law enforcement agency has a duty to investigate 
cybercrime  at  the  request  of  member  states,  Europol  does  not  have  the  mandate  to 
investigate cybercrime by those member states.6 Such a statement stands in tension with the 
Council of Europe Convention, which does not expressly exclude the actions of governments 
when those actions are unlawful. 
Fourth,  member  states’  large-scale  surveillance  practices  blur  the  lines  between  national 
security and matters relating to EU competence when they threaten to spill over into the 
security activities of the EU institutions and its agencies. Member states may have the main 
competence in relation to national security, but the Union has shared competence with the 
member states when it comes to the Union's internal security, particularly as regards the 
policy areas of terrorism and crime. Indeed there are considerable overlaps between national 
security and EU internal security. EU security agencies such as Europol, for instance, have 
been established with the prime task of gathering, exchanging and processing information on 
‘threats’ facing the Union, based on data supplied by the member states’ law enforcement and 
security agencies. The minimal oversight of this information exchange leaves EU agencies 
unable to verify the original source of the information received, nor guarantee that it has 
been  obtained  via  lawful  means.  This  becomes  particularly  problematic  should  the  EU’s 
institutions  and  its  agencies  become  implicated  in  using,  sharing  and  exploiting  data 
generated  by  unlawful  surveillance  practices,  which  could  leave  the  EU  complicit  and 
potentially liable for any breach of human rights or rule of law standards. Measures enacted 
under the banner of national security will quite rightly invoke EU interest when those actions 
jeopardise the internal security of the Union as a whole and make it more difficult for the EU 
to perform its responsibilities under the treaties in a consistent and coherent fashion.  
These four arguments give the EU clear competence to intervene in the wake of the Snowden 
surveillance  scandals.  They  lend  support  to  the  conclusion  of  the  European  Parliament 
inquiry that “discussion and action at EU level is not only legitimate, but also a matter of EU 
autonomy and sovereignty.”7 The draft report emanating from the Parliament’s inquiry has 
just been published and will be presented to the LIBE Committee on 9 January 2014. It 
contains a number of important findings and some welcome recommendations that could 
provide a springboard for the next European Parliament and Commission to take strong 
follow-up action.  
The EU institutions should begin by turning attention to the deficiencies in domestic and 
European-level  oversight  of  security  agencies,  in  order  to  remedy  the  problems  of 
independence and weak technical capacities identified in oversight bodies across EU member 
states. It would be critical to explore the scope for a European policy infrastructure to provide 
a  permanent  oversight  mechanism  capable  of  reacting  to  recurrent  breaches  by  EU  and 
foreign intelligence agencies when they encroach on the rights and freedoms of EU citizens. 
The European Parliament draft report suggests establishing a ‘High Level Group’ to develop 
common  standards  and  strengthen  oversight  of  intelligence  bodies,  although  it  doesn’t 
specify  which  institutional  actors  would  steer  such  a  group  or  who  would  ensure  the 
                                                             
6 Testimony of Rob Wainwright at the LIBE Committee Hearing on the Electronic Mass Surveillance of EU 
Citizens, European Parliament, 24 September 2013. 
7 Draft report of the European Parliament on the Electronic Mass Surveillance of EU Citizens, 2013/2188(INI), 23 
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implementation of these standards. The danger here of creating another opaque, member 
state-led task force is all too real.  
A more promising approach, potentially delivering more effective democratic scrutiny, would 
be to embed this oversight mechanism within the European Parliament, by transforming the 
European Parliament’s temporary inquiry into a permanent (joint) parliamentary oversight 
unit  within  the  LIBE  Committee.8  Composed  of  a  group  of  LIBE  representatives,  the 
proposed unit would focus on the central task of developing an EU professional code for the 
transnational management of data and intelligence cooperation.9 The unit would also work 
closely  with  national  parliaments  and  could  provide  a  supranational  forum  for  national 
oversight mechanisms and bodies to meet regularly, thereby addressing current oversight 
gaps and the lack of resources in domestic arenas. Based on the minimum standards set by 
the  European  courts  and  international  instruments,  this  code  could  serve  as  a  guiding 
framework for intelligence bodies and EU agencies, setting the ‘red lines’ that security bodies 
cannot cross in democratic regimes when conducting surveillance. 10 
The establishment of an effective European level of oversight would undoubtedly represent a 
step change in the EU’s approach to member states’ intelligence activities. Yet, supranational 
monitoring  may  be  the  only  way  forward  now  that  the  evolution  in  communications 
technologies  has  brought  about  a  reconfiguration  in  surveillance,  allowing  intelligence 
communities  to  access  and  process  personal  data  on  an  unprecedented  scale.  Routine, 
unauthorised and mass capture of data for strategic surveillance has taken us beyond the 
traditional post 9/11 debate about the balance between ‘security versus privacy’. It puts the 
very nature of open societies and democratic rule of law at risk and constitutes a systematic 
and persistent breach of the Union’s values; if the EU is seen as ineffective in protecting those 
principles and its citizens, its very credibility will be called into question. 
                                                             
8 The EP Draft Report makes reference to “the establishment of a standing oversight mechanism for data transfers 
and judicial remedies within the competent committee”, ibid., p.33. 
9 Other competences could include the close scrutiny and monitoring of EU security agencies, such as Europol. 
See European Parliament, Draft Report, on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation and Training (Europol) and repealing 
Decisions 009/371/JHA and 005/681/JHA, 19.6.2013, Rapporteur: Díaz de Mera. 
10 For a comprehensive set of policy recommendations, see Bigo et al. (2013), op. cit. 